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From Medieval to Tudor times, the doctrine of the 
King’s Two Bodies was fundamental in government 
and the reproduction of social order. The 
doctrine held that the body of the Monarch is 
simultaneously mortal and immortal. In terms of 
the hegemony of the power regime, this was given 
by God.  It has long been assumed that the rise 
of Liberal Plebiscitary Parliamentary Democracy 
put an end to Royal absolutism. This paper uses 
the political thought of Carl Schmitt and Ernst 
Hartwig Kantorowicz to examine if this assumption 
is valid.  The paper argues that the doctrine of 
the King’s Two Bodies survives in greatly 
translated form. The highest achieved celebrities 
today have two bodies, the one (biological and 
incorrigible), the other (mediated and 
incorrigible).  The paper uses data from the 
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posthumous existence of the highest achieved 
celebrities to substantiate this proposition.  In 
turn, this leads to the beginnings of an enquiry 
into what the role of achieved celebrity in 
Liberal, Plebiscitary Parliamentary Democracy 
i.e. a society based on the principle if 









It is in the nature of ascribed celebrity to make 
ultimate appeals to the necessity and relevance 
of its raison d’etre by reaching out to the 
rubrics of cosmology and tradition. After all, in 
the matter of ascribed celebrity, fame is not 
primarily a subject of talent, skill or 
accomplishment. Rather, it is the gift of 
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heredity (Rojek 2001). Prestigious bloodline 
delivers public renown, so that even an infant of 
royal blood is instantly famous. This is a direct 
reflection of immemorial privilege and custom. 
Typically, it is originally justified on a priori 
grounds, by reason of popular faith in the decree 
of a deity, a group of deities, or some other 
supernatural force, of this sort. Historically 
speaking, this is apparent in the doctrine of the 
king’s two bodies. To our way of thinking, it is 
absurd to claim that a mortal can have two 
bodies. Granted, most people would like to think 
that they are remembered when they are gone. But 
in ordinary life, the notion that a body can, by 
right, be an immemorial, ongoing, developing, 
political, cultural and economic force in 
subjectively meaningful relations with strangers 
would be rejected as unsound.  Conversely, for 
the Tudor Kings of England, and their courtiers, 
it was an article of faith, no less obvious and 
steadfast than the certainty that the sunset will 
be followed by the sunrise. The doctrine may be 
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investigated here to clarify some of the unusual 
features of ascribed and achieved celebrity, and 
the metaphysical nexus that both ultimately, 
share.  
In this respect the hitherto neglected work in 
Celebrity Studies of Carl Schmitt and Ernest 
Hartwig Kantorowicz will prove to be useful 
resources. Before endeavouring to put flesh upon 
these bones, it is incumbent to declare plainly 
that, procedurally, there are technical 
impediments in the path of adopting Schmitt and 
Kantorowicz as reputable influence’s. No doubt, 
these have already been factors in restricting 
their influence in the study of celebrity.  As a 
Weimar legal theorist, and, in time, a ‘Crown 
Jurist’, Schmitt participated, eagerly, and 
enthusiastically in the attempt to justify Nazi 
rule (Minca and Rowan 2014: A1; Mehring 2014). He 
was a fervent anti-semite. He defended Hitler’s 
extra-judicial killing’s of political opponents 
and the ‘cleansing’ of German Jurisprudence of 
Jewish influence (Gross 2007). His vigorous 
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defence of the necessity for ‘he who decides the 
exception’ in the moments of crisis faced by 
liberal democracy, brilliantly revealed the 
hypocrisy of Plebiscitary Parliamentary Democracy 
in submitting that it had done with absolutism 
and sovereign rule and was, ispo facto, morally 
superior. However, Schmitt’s contribution was not 
just to invert a fallible load-bearing beam of 
liberalism. Inevitably, it also opened-up a 
pretext for justifying absolutist solutions to be 
imposed upon the body politic. Schmitt’s writings 
made it easier for Hitler to bootstrap his way to 
dictatorship in Germany. This is hard to ignore, 
and difficult to forgive. 
What of Kantorowicz?  A disciple of the German 
poet and mystic, Stefan George, he was a German 
Jew who volunteered for the First World War and 
fought at the front. After the Allied victory, he 
returned to join the right-wing Freikorps 
militia. He was personally involved in destroying 
Polish forces in the Greater Poland Uprising 
(1918-19) and the general strike in Berlin 
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(1919), known as the Spartacus or January, 
uprising. Later, he was wounded in street-
fighting in Munich, while fighting with 
nationalist’s against the socialist government 
(Fleming 2016: 105). Once it became 
incontrovertible that Nazi racial policy put even 
assimilated German Jews at risk, he fled Germany 
in 1938.  He made first, to Oxford for a short 
interlude, then, to the University of California, 
at Berkley, and finally, the Institute for 
Advanced Study, Princeton. Yet his enthusiastic 
involvement in the freikorps continued to mire 
his work in controversy and scandal. 
In mitigation, it need hardly be added that the 
virtues of an idea, or argument, bear no 
necessary correlation with the virtue, or want of 
virtue, in the life of the begetter. It is 
perfectly consistent to deplore the brutal, 
personal histories of Schmitt and Kantorowicz, 
while allowing that their respective, accounts 
that metaphysics are part of the composition of 
secular law and politics, are of interest, and 
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repay consideration. These resources are 
contributions to a phenomenology of celebrity.  
That is, they offer intimations which go beyond 
orthodox scientific and technological method in 
accounting for why some forms of celebrity is 
such a galvanizing force in subjective meaning. 
This is the position adopted in the present 
study. 
In a famous historical study, it has been argued 
that the doctrine of the King’s Two Bodies has 
its roots in Medieval theology (Kantorowicz 
1957). Like all counter-intuitive doctrines, a 
little elucidation is required to illuminate this 
now forgotten cast of mind.  After all, we are 
accustomed to the idea that we have a single 
body, which is born, matures and eventually dies. 
For most people this is the beginning and end of 
the matter. Against this, it must be said that we 
are not Monarch’s, or perhaps it is better to 
say, Tudor Monarch’s. The latter took it as an 
irreproachable given, that they possessed two 
bodies. As with all men and women, one body, is 
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biological and corruptible. The other is ruled by 
God to be incorruptible, and so eternal. In this 
second, but co-equal sense, the Monarch is not a 
mere man or woman, but a character angelicus, a 
living immortal (Raffield 2017: 37). Somewhat 
more than a self-regarding, cranky point of view 
is at issue here. It is not just that Tudor 
Monarchs thought about religion and embodiment in 
ways that contrast starkly with the present day. 
They also used this way of thinking, and acting, 
for political ends. 
Consider, briefly the case of Henry VIII (1491-
1547). Most readers will know that Henry VIII had 
six wives, and was responsible for the English 
Reformation. The role of the doctrine of the 
King’s Two Bodies in his reign is less popularly 
appreciated. What is the issue here, and how does 
it relate to the topic of celebrity? 
First, it is necessary to be clear about the 
unique nature of ascribed celebrity that Henry 
eventually claimed was his due. In 1503, the 
eleven year Henry VIII married Catherine of 
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Aragon, the widow of his brother, Arthur. The 
union failed to produce a surviving male heir. 
This created a major crisis in the relationship, 
and in the affairs of state. To Henry’s way of 
thinking, the cause of continuity in Regal 
supremacy required him to have a son. This, 
together with his infatuation with Anne Boleyn, 
led him to press for a divorce from Catherine 
which, he knew, the Pope was unlikely to condone. 
Only something extraordinary could persuade Rome 
to grant Henry’s desire for divorce. But whither 
the grounds?  In order to understand the mind-set 
of the king it is necessary to remark that this 
was not a question that Henry asked of other men, 
he asked it of God. What in God’s view could 
permit Henry to legitimately divorce Catherine? 
It is not exactly accurate to say that he was 
‘alone’ in speaking directly to God in this 
matter. As with all Monarchs, Henry had his 
advisors and cannon law experts, of whom Thomas 
More, Cardinal Wolsey and later, Thomas Cromwell, 
were the most important.  Indeed, his unstable 
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character probably led him to be heavily reliant 
upon the counsel of others. Henry’s advisors were 
tasked with the object of finding a religious 
pretext that would enable him to end the marriage 
to Catherine and take Anne Boleyn as his new 
bride.  
The answer they found was in the Book of 
Leviticus. Henry, and his advisors, believed that 
a passage here, dissolved the legality of his 
marriage to Catherine: 
 
  If a man shall take his brother’s wife,  
  it is an impurity. He hath uncovered  
  his brother’s nakedness: they shall be 
  childless (Leviticus 20:12) 
 
Henry was convinced that no Pope could contravene 
this edict. His argument was that scripture was 
superior to papal authority and cannon law, in 
faithfully interpreting the word of God (Redworth 
1987:32). Leviticus provided him with the pretext 
to insist that only divorce would cleanse his 
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(unintended) sin. Even at this high point of 
ascribed celebrity, it was not sufficient for 
Henry alone, to make his case. Already, he 
required experts, or in the language of Celebrity 
Studies today, ‘cultural intermediaries’, to 
represent him to Rome and his subjects in the 
best light (Sharpe 2009) . Foremost among his 
appointees was Edward Foxe, Provost of King’s 
College, Cambridge. The tract that Foxe and his 
associates prepared was indeed, fit for a Monarch 
who saw himself as first among men, and 
answerable only to God. According to it, the Pope 
is categorized as nothing more than the ‘bishop’ 
of God’s diocese i.e. Rome. In contrast, Henry is 
nominated as ‘God’s Vicar on earth’. It was not 
merely a distinction that privileged Henry over 
other Monarchs, it exalted him. This anointed 
position situated the King in a relation of 
supreme power over his dominions, the clergy and 
the laity (Guy 2014). By definition, no mortal 
was recognized to possess the authority to 
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question his jurisdiction. The King had a duty to 
God, and to God alone was he accountable.   
The incisive effect of the doctrine of the King’s 
two bodies was to achieve a type of cultural 
transference which, prima facie seems improbable, 
if not impossible (Greenblat 2009: 65). The 
immutability of the king in time was transferred 
from the sphere of theology, to the sphere of 
law. That is to say, the metaphysical pretext for 
granting the King consummate, earthly authority, 
was traced into the law books and court 
practices. Divine law and public law became one.   
The logic of the law can be stated as follows. 
Since Man is imperfect, the ways of God are 
finally, beyond human comprehension. This very 
imperfection requires mankind to have a 
mouthpiece so as to correct the inadmissible ways 
that humans seek to fulfil God’s purpose. The 
doctrine of the King’s Two Bodies anointed the 
Monarch to be the legitimate steward of God’s 
will on earth. God may be present in all earthly 
affairs, but his mouthpiece in England would now 
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be understood to be the King.  The monarch then, 
did not claim perfection.  Only God is perfect.  
What was claimed is that the Monarch is next in 
line to God in connecting the earth to the realm 
of the divine.  The latter is finally unknowable, 
but propinquity to it is necessary in order to 
safeguard purposeful order n earthly affairs. Not 
only was this claim made, it carried the 
requirement that citizens must believe and 
honour it and suffer the pain of punishment if 
they did not. The chief consequence of this was 
that theology and metaphysics were, historically, 
the footprints upon which modern legality and 
politics took its cue. Revelation, drama and 
ritual, which were the hallmarks of Christian 
religion, became keynote’s of Monarchical 
political practice (Kahn 2009: 77). This doctrine 
suited Henry and his advisors very well. It was 
highly convenient for Henry’s purposes to defend 
the doctrine that the Monarch is the final court 
of earthly affairs.  For it rendered the 
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adjudication of these matters to be ultimately 
subject to the King’s conscience.  
As Western society developed the plebiscitary 
form of Parliamentary Democracy, the naked 
influence of religious theology on political 
practice became sedimented with innumerable 
secular justifications, codicils and caveats. The 
fact that terrestrial factors have stepped up to 
take the place of the King in acting as the 
conscience of the affairs of mankind, did not 
mean that politics freed itself from its 
metaphysical roots. Rather, Reason, which after 
the Enlightenment, indiscriminately promulgated 
equality, liberty and justice as the fundamental 
Rights of Man, remained the servant of 
presuppositions that were metaphysical in origin. 
Among them, is the false belief that destiny 
ordains universal reconciliation in the affairs 
of mankind.  To this, Manichean critics have 
responded with the argument that the state of 
being, in itself, cannot be transformed into a 
state of being, for itself. Reconciliation is a 
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false hope, because  the struggle between good 
and evil is eternal (Kolakowski 1990: 77). 
        The main argument of this paper is that, 
in the politics and culture of the present day, 
the doctrine of the King’s Two bodies survives. 
But, as we shall see presently, it does so in a 
form much altered since the Tudor period.  It has 
transferred over from ascribed celebrity to 
achieved celebrity. Before coming to this in more 
detail, it is necessary to go a bit further into 
the proposition that political theology and 
practice is the child of metaphysics. 
 
Schmitt and the Dance of Liberal Fictions 
 
Kantorowicz’s argument is partly an engagement 
with the discredited German legal theorist and 
prominent jurist, Carl Schmitt (1). The latter 
argued famously in the 1920s, that the modern 
secular state is based finally, not upon the 
might of Reason, but upon the unacknowledged 
legacy of Religion. The political concepts of the 
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state are secularized transformations of 
theological precedents. The base of all politics 
is therefore held to be metaphysics. Normative 
order is raised and maintained upon this 
foundation. However, it comes with a major 
problem. The metaphysical conundrums engrained in 
the central concepts of liberalism, saddle 
Plebiscitary Parliamentary Democracy with 
intractable, repeated dilemmas of system 
reproduction. For Schmitt, these conundrums 
stubbornly recur because the essential 
metaphysical contradictions of liberalism are 
insoluble. Liberal Plebiscitary Parliaments 
presuppose the will of a free and equal 
electorate.  To Schmitt’s way of thinking, it is 
perfectly obvious that men and women are not free 
or equal and that multinational corporations have 
no political loyalties, as such, to either 
freedom or equality. On this reckoning, the fate 
of Plebiscitary Parliamentary Democracy is sadly, 
a most, onerous and pitiable one. Because the 
real distribution of power is contrary to what 
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Parliament purports it to be, the fate of 
Plebiscitary Democracy is to perpetually promise 
what, perpetually, it fails to fully deliver. 
Therefore, it is continually vulnerable to the 
objection that the system, as a whole, is not 
working, and is unable live up to the lofty 
standards that it has set itself. 
Schmitt contends that, what Habermas (1975) later 
called ‘the legitimation crisis’ of Western 
liberalism, is part of the bricks and mortar of 
Liberal Plebiscitary Parliamentary Democracy. The 
only serious question is whether it remains 
containable, or degenerates into melt-down. He 
(1985) deploys a battery of arguments to advance 
this case.  
Foremost among them is the proposition that the 
logic of liberalism is profoundly faulty. The 
central tenet of every known democracy is 
equality (Schmitt 1985: 13-16). By this token, it 
is incomprehensible to describe the society of 
the Tudor Kings as a democracy. For one thing, 
the doctrine of the King’s Two Bodies inflexibly 
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arrogates divine rights to the Monarch. Henry 
VIII believed that he was entitled to defy Papal 
law because the King is the exception to the 
public law and the law of the Vatican. The Tudor 
state, therefore, determined that it is in the 
essence of sovereign power to have one foot in 
normative order, and the other in the realm of 
the divine. The King’s power derives finally, 
from the popular faith that the sovereign is, so 
to speak, ‘super-normative’. In the sight of 
ordinary men and women, the character of the 
Courtly power that surrounds him, is a corpus 
mysticum (2). This means that in Medieval (and 
Tudor) theology the Monarch is understood to be 
potestas absoluta in terra i.e. to be among men, 
but to co-exist, with autonomous motion, not 
given to others (Herrero 2015: 1165) (3). 
Democracy expunges this principle from its 
estate. There is good reason for this. By 
definition, democracy is a society of equals i.e. 
equal rights of enfranchisement, equal liberties 
before the law. It cannot defer to a law of 
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division between that minority who are notionally 
granted divine rights, and the enlightened, 
public who, as free citizens, do not recognize 
these rights for themselves. Thus, liberal 
democracy cannot be truly tolerant and inclusive. 
It is compelled to show a militaristic lack of 
tolerance and vigilant exclusivity to individuals 
and groups that bear heterogeneous 
characteristics and traits of behaviour that 
imperil the principle of democratic homogeneity. 
This compromises the claim of liberalism to be a 
society of equals. In its bearing towards 
heterogeneity, it is finally, exclusive and 
punitive. Schmitt (1985) attacks the principle of 
liberal equality from another angle. Liberal 
democracy proclaims equality for all living 
within its territorial boundaries. Conversely, it 
suspects and punishes aliens and foreigners 
because they do not conform to its standards of 
homogeneity. Schmitt presents this as more proof 
that in liberal democracies the law of Reason 
rests upon metaphysical sands.  
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Plebiscitary Parliamentary Democracy is, in 
actuality, the indentured servant of metaphysics.  
According to Schmitt (1985), this is far from 
being the end to the matter. For one thing, the 
proposition that liberalism is antithetical to 
heterogeneity means that it actively requires 
enemies and foes in order to uphold and refurbish 
its ‘way of life’. This means that liberal 
democracies oblige a war-like orientation in 
their framework, if not alwaysin their demeanour.  
           There is also the problem of the 
fictive nature of equality under liberalism. In 
order to illustrate what is at stake here, 
Schmitt (1985: 10) tellingly, alights upon the 
example of the British Empire (4). The British 
portrayed their Empire as a morally virtuous 
project of nation-building, on the grounds that 
it proclaimed and enforced equal, impartial 
standards of liberty and justice, wherever its 
flag was raised and flown. With inexorable logic, 
Schmitt admonishes the moral politics of this 
project as an absurdity. He regards it to be a 
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grotesque, self-serving philosophy, fit for a 
bargee land-grabber, but in no way acceptable to 
any jurist worth his salt. Of the more than four 
hundred million inhabitants in the British Empire 
of Schmitt’s day, he calculated that over three 
hundred million were not recognized as British 
citizens (Schmitt 1985: 10). British ideologues 
fudged their rights and status by spinning 
constructs of administrative convenience. By 
designating the adopted lands as ‘colonies’, 
‘protectorates’, or governed by ‘mandates’ or 
‘intervention treaties’, their heterogeneous 
cultures were permitted to persist in their 
accustomed way of life, but only under sufferance 
to the sovereign Parliament of Westminster. If 
ultimate proof were needed to show the fictive 
character of equality in the British Empire, all 
that is required is to look at the condition of 
the ‘native’ population. Deprived of the 
franchise and the Civil Rights enjoyed by the 
white settler and colonial governing population, 
the natives are embraced by the Empire, but 
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strictly as subordinate citizens. The Empire 
depends upon their labour, but requires them to 
be a subject class in the public realm.  
When all is said and done, Schmitt (1985) 
concluded that, under the roof of liberal 
democracy, in which all nominally, enjoy the same 
shelter, rights and advantages, there is, in 
actuality, one law for the few, and another for 
the majority. Thus, the feted principle of 
equality is specious. In Schmitt’s perspective, 
there is nothing surprising about this. If one 
moves away from the case of the British Empire, 
to consider the validity of equality as a 
universal political Right, things in liberalism 
fall apart in short order. People do not face one 
another as abstractions, but as ‘politically 
interested’, ‘politically determined’ persons 
(Schmitt 1985: 11). To subtract these interests 
and determinations from human encounters would be 
very far from leaving a balance of abstract 
equality which, ‘under the surface of 
difference’, genuinely unites mankind. 
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‘An absolute human equality, then,’ Schmitt 
(1985: 12), concludes,’ would be an equality 
understood only in terms of itself and without 
risk; it would be an equality without the 
necessary correlate of inequality, and as a 
result, conceptually and practically meaningless, 
an indifferent equality.’  
 
The New Caesarism and the Problem of Jurisdiction 
  
Where the reproduction dilemmas of liberalism 
become manifest and resist Liberal Parliamentary 
homilies, the stage is set for strong leaders to 
step out of the wings and take charge (Schmitt 
2005). Schmitt uses the term ‘the new Caesarism’ 
to refer to this phenomenon. The strong 
leader/new Caesar is an achieved political 
celebrity who possesses boldness combined with a 
clarity of vision to sweep aside the 
Parliamentary bottleneck and take decisive 
actions that count. The superior power of the 
sovereign leader resides in the capacity to 
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‘decide the exception’ (Schmitt 2005: 36). In 
spite of their differences then, Monarchies and 
Republics are alike in important respects. The 
omnipotent dictator resembles the omnipotent God, 
both analogically, and in terms of autonomous 
motion (Roberts 2015: 467). Thus, the strong 
leader in the Republic operates on the logic that 
he too possesses the power to ‘decide the 
exception’. Correspondingly, it should be noted, 
this feature is a prime element in accounting for 
their celebrity and glamour with the public. In 
conditions of emergency or crisis wherein 
Plebiscitary Parliamentary Democracy is in 
default, liberalism, unintentionally provides for 
‘strong leaders’ to save the day. At the time 
that he was writing the studies for which he 
remains most famous (and notorious), Mussolini 
and Hitler were emerging as veritable ‘saviours’ 
of their respective nations. But this is not the 
main component in the balance to be extracted 
from Schmitt’s thought here. 
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In Tudor England, an obvious question was raised 
by the doctrine that the Monarch has absolute 
jurisdiction over people of all ranks. Was the 
King, who issues the laws of the land, also bound 
by them (Shoemaker 2017)?  Not surprisingly, 
Henry’s attempt to use Leviticus to annul the 
marriage to Catherine was refused by the Pope. In 
revenge, Henry sacked the authority and 
privileges of Rome. He declared himself Supreme 
Head of the Church of England and broke with the 
Papacy. Eventually, his hubris was ablated by 
excommunication from the Church of Rome. Far from 
being downcast, Henry regarded excommunication to 
vindicate the justice of his case. Those in 
England who opposed the Acts of Supremacy and 
Succession were brutally punished. In fine, Henry 
proclaimed that he had breached the rule of a 
thousand years, which ordained that King’s rule 
the bodies of their subjects, while it is for 
Pope’s to govern their soul’s. Now he declared 
himself to be doubly empowered: the body and soul 
of all in his dominion were henceforth, to be at 
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his command. Among all ascribed celebrities in 
history, he determined to be first without equal.   
         As a case study of ascribed celebrity, 
Henry VIII is peerless. He was the double 
exception. As we have seen, merely by virtue of 
bloodline, the doctrine of the King’s Two Bodies 
was sufficient to afford him instant fame. What 
heightened this to a stratospheric level was his 
insistence that he was the Vicar of God, 
overriding the Holy Church of Rome. Thus, he 
became the defender of, not only a 
territorialized earthly realm, but also a divine 
religion in defiance of Rome, which was destined 
to girdle the world, by means of Empire. In 
Christendom this was unprecedented. For our 
purposes, it should be noted that this was not 
only a matter of practical statecraft, it was 
also, quite deliberately, a strategy of personal 
aggrandizement. Henry’s intent was to make his 
fame ubiquitous, and beyond peradventure. The 
stakes in breaking with the Papacy demanded 
nothing less. By his own lights, the Most High 
 27 
and Most Excellent of King’s, was also meant to 
be venerated as the world’s foremost ascribed 
celebrity. Prior to him, no other Monarch in 
Christendom had sought to ‘decide the exception’ 
with such dramatic force.  
Henry VIII was far from being the last English 
Monarch to make use of the doctrine of the King’s 
Two Bodies as a stratagem of exceptionalism. In 
1649, when the Stuart King, Charles I, was 
brought to trial on the charge of treason, by the 
leaders of the revolutionary army, of whom Oliver 
Cromwell was the foremost, he made repeated 
recourse to the doctrine of the King’s Two 
Bodies. The prosecution alleged that the King was 
‘trusted with a limited power’ which he rendered 
forfeit ‘out of a wicked design to erect and 
uphold himself an unlimited and tyrannical power 
to rule according to his will’ (Petrie 1935: 
241). The prerogatives of Charles were condemned 
as sheer ‘pretence’ designed to ‘advance’ and 
‘uphold’ a ‘personal interest’ against the public 
good, common rights, liberty, justice and peace 
 28 
of the nation (Petrie 1935: 243). The heart of 
Charles’s defence was that his prosecutor’s had 
no lawful authority to submit him suffer trial. 
His privileged position over all other men and 
women, he argued, was ‘commended’, ‘by old and 
lawful descent’ directly ordained by God (Petrie 
1935: 245). ‘A king cannot be tried by any 
superior jurisdiction on earth’ asserted Charles 
(Petrie 1935: 248). To the wrath of the Court, on 
this fundamental principle, he stuck to his guns. 
Like Henry VIII, before him, Charles insisted 
that he was ‘God’s vicar’, and therefore 
independent of the commands and judgements of 
men. It came to nothing. The Court condemned him 
to death. On January 29
th
, 1649, as he faced the 
judgement of the axe, he was said to have 
commented, to the Bishop of London, ‘I go from a 
corruptible to an incorruptible crown, where 
there will be no more trouble’ (Petrie 1935: 
273). To the end, he took it for granted that the 
King’s mortal body comes to dust, while the 
divine body continues its immortal course. 
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         Now, it might be considered that these 
matters between God and ascribed celebrity have 
no bearing on the analysis of achieved celebrity 
today. It is reasonable to suppose that the 
matter of the king’s two bodies was settled with 
the execution of Charles I. To this line of 
argument, it might first, be objected, that the 
respect shown to the proposition that the 
dynamics of ascribed celebrity have anything to 
impart to achieved celebrities today, is 
untenable. It goes without saying that ascribed 
celebrity continues to be a feature of the social 
order. But its absolutist credentials have been 
falsified. The doctrine of the King’s Two Bodies 
has no place in the world of science and one 
man/one vote. But is it valid to propose that 
achieved celebrity, which has supplanted it, is 
free from metaphysics or the vestiges of the 
corpus mysticum from which it emerged? 
            With the displacement of the Monarch 
from the pinnacle of renown, the doctrine of the 
King’s Two Bodies fell on increasingly deaf ears. 
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Parliamentary Democracy had finally overthrown 
the absolutism of the Monarch, and formally, at 
least, crushed the divine precept upon which 
exceptionalism resided. Nothing could be clearer 
clearer or more binding. The body of the demos 
has replaced the two bodies of the King (Turner 
2004, 2009).  Contrarily, if anything is to be 
preserved from Schmitt’s (1985) critique of 
equality, it is the insight that liberal 
Plebiscitary Parliamentary Democracy is a sham. 
Royal absolutism has been overcome. What remains 
is not however, a homogeneous, community of 
equals. Plebiscitary Parliamentary Democracy 
perpetuates a real heterogeneity of power, that 
the gloss of formal homogeneity denies. This is 
evident in the unequal political cultural power 
that the rich have in comparison with the poor. 
It is also apparent that some individuals, 
despite being formally equal with the body 
politic, accumulate and advance cultural capital 
over others, which makes them blatantly unequal 
in terms of status differentiation. 
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Within the Liberal Parliamentary system, 
Schmitt’s (2005) principle of he who ‘decides the 
exception’ has survived in, what might be called, 
a ‘reserve battalion’ of political authority. 
This is perceived to provide stability and unity 
when the ordinary procedures of Liberal 
Plebiscitary Parliamentary Democracy are 
perceived as being unable to resolve major 
structural vicissitudes or emergencies. But this 
reserve battalion does not consist of ascribed 
celebrities.  Nor is the exception concentrated 
in matters of politics.  The attraction of ‘he 
who decides the exception is most keenly felt in 
issues of lifestyle and personal integrity. It is 
a matter managed by the regiment of achieved 
celebrities.   
By way of immediately interjecting a cautionary 
note, it might be thought that the rise to power 
of elected achieved celebrities such as, Vladimir 
Putin and Donald Trump suggest that the public 
see these figures as having the power to ‘decide 
the exception’. To be sure, it is no part of the 
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argumet that Putin and Trump do not possess 
political and economic powers that can change the 
conditions of life for the majority of their 
citizens.  But there is no general public 
conflation between them, as mortal bodies, and 
the divine. Moreover, their powers are recognized 
as technical and finite, not transcendant and 
immutable. Even under conditions of 
secularization, citizens still hunger for high 
trust relations with figures who can ‘decide the 
exception’ and whose actions can be revered as 
transcendant and immutable. On the question of 
these powers, over the last half century or so, 
there has been a slippage from the front rank of 
elected achieved political celebrities to the 
reserve battalion of achieved celebrities in the 
fields of, sport, television, film , music and 
the other branches of the entertainment industry. 
Students of achieved celebrity have certainly 
commented upon this. For example, Roach (2007: 
36) operates with a version of a two bodies 
thesis as it pertains to achieved celebrity. 
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According to him, the star has corporeal body 
which is fated to decay and die; and a ‘body 
cinematic’, which does neither.  However, he does 
not fully develop the implications of his 
insight. It is not just that major achieved 
celebrities have a ‘cinematic body’.  They are 
also intuitively, revered for possession what 
might be termed here, special powers, that are 
not given to ordinary mortals and influence on 
popular culture in ways which are transcendent 
and the immutable.  Thus, achieved celebrities 
today have been proclaimed to be ‘intercessionary 
figures, gods in human form’ with a ‘presence 
(that) spans and translates between two worlds’ 
(Frow 1998: 202). It is considered, unremarkable 
to describe them as ‘objects of worship’ who 
‘mediate between internal and external reality’ 
(Alexander 2010: 325). Theoretically, all of this 
suggests a deep homology between achieved 
celebrities and the sacred. It need not be held 
that the homology is, or should be, codified. The 
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essence of spirituality is to be transparent in 
practice, but unwritten. 
Like Banquo’s ghost, the Tudor doctrine of the 
King’s Two Bodies has returned, but now it has 
exchanged its space of manifestation from the 
Court, to popular culture. The connection of 
achieved celebrity with the sacred accounts for 
the popular associations it has with autonomous 
motion, transcendence and immutability.  
Strictly speaking, there is nothing exactly, new 
in the proposition that achieved celebrity and 
the sacred are enmeshed. Morin suggested that the 
celestial position of ‘the stars’ in modern 
culture, owes something to the popular perception 
that achieved celebrities possess super-natural, 
or quasi-super-natural, powers (Morin 2005, 
original 1957). The idea, one might say, has been 
around for over half a century. Notwithstanding 
this, there are many sceptics. The objections are 
predictable. If achieved celebrity is analogous 
to, or presumptive of, the sacred, what set of 
religious or metaphysical beliefs and 
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institutions is at issue: pagan, animist, 
Christian, Muslim etc?  Is it not more persuasive 
to analyze the influence of achieved celebrity by 
making excursions into economics and politics, 
rather than into religion or metaphysics i.e. by 
investigating the commercial and political 
strings attached to the elevation of achieved 
celebrity?  Nathalie Heinich has perhaps, 
presented the strongest articulation of this 
point of view. She dismisses the notions that 
celebrity culture entails religious connections 
of recognition and belonging, and Christian 
motifs of transcendence and immutability (Heinich 
2014: 73). Instead, she regards celebrity to be a 
commodity, plain and simple. Achieved celebrities 
are social constructions involving the labour of 
cultural intermediaries who work as image-makers. 
The processes of celebrity elevation in public 
consciousness, is a matter of commodification.  
Part of this process may involve cultural 
intermediaries attributing ‘special powers’ to 
the achieved celebrities that they are contracted 
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to represent. This  has nothing to do with 
sanctification, or real metaphysical powers. More 
accurately, it is better described as part of the 
process of celebrity ‘image packaging’. 
        Heinich pushes ahead with her case by 
citing and critically interrogating Halpern’s 
proposition that the ‘enthronement procedures’ of 
a celebrity on the Hollywood Walk of Fame, are 
analogous to the procedures of beatification in 
the Catholic Church, (Halpern 2007: Heinich 2014: 
76). For Heinich, Halpern does not compare like 
with like, and therefore, his proposition cannot 
carry. In Heinich’s view, the ‘crucial’ ball that 
he drops is that Hollywood enthronement 
procedures are entirely ‘civil’ in substance. 
Conversely, the Vatican’s conferment of 
beatification is entirely religious i.e. it 
refers to the judgement that an act (or acts) 
made by a mortal is of sufficient super-normative 
value as to be classified as ‘saintly’ and, ipso 
facto, related to God.  
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Effectively, Heinich submits that to situate 
religion alongside commodification is a category 
error.  Too much can be made of this. It is true 
that the pure form of religious belief is 
disinterested. However, saying that the pure form 
is disinterested in a world in which original sin 
is universal, does not make the representation of 
disinterest less compelling. Religious believers 
are still moved by the ideal of devotion to God, 
the word of Mohammed etc, even when the 
articulation of belief is wrapped up in financial 
transactions. As soon as the offertory plate 
found its way into the temple of religious 
observance, the argument that religion is 
separate from commodification has been tricky to 
make.   
It is one thing to demonstrate over-confidence in 
the nomination of category errors, but Heinch 
compounds difficulties by implying that religious 
sentiment is absent from the culture of achieved 
celebrity. Like Cashmore (2006), she maintains 
that to explain achieved celebrity, it is not 
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necessary to get involved with the murky waters 
of metaphysics, the sacred and theology. One need 
look no further than the commodification process, 
as it obtains under fully developed capitalism.   
       To this it may be countered that it is one 
thing to pay due respect to the importance of 
commodification in the culture of achieved 
celebrity. However, very little is gained by 
permitting it to hog centre stage. In order to 
fully explain the affective intensity that first 
rank achieved celebrities have over subjective 
meaning, the question of the phenomenology of 
celebrity must, at least, be raised.  
Phenomenology is the philosophy of experience and 
consciousness. A powerful component in its 
composition is the idea, found in Spinoza, 
Liebinz, Pascal, Husserl, Bergson and Merleau-
Ponty, that some forms of meaning can be 
experienced and observed which have no name.  
Another way of putting this is that these forms 
of observation and experience exceed the 
capacities of science and technology (which rule 
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the modern world) to encapsulate them. It might 
as well be stated at this point, that the subject 
of the King’s Two Bodies (and the Two Bodies of 
Achieved Celebrities) touches upon questions of 
phenomenology at every point.  To bring them out 
in a detailed, rigorous fashion would require 
more space than remains at my disposal here.  
Nevertheless, something of what is at issue can 
be flagged by referring briefly, to Leszek 
Kolakowski’s treatment of phenomenology and the 
ultimate questions of life Kolakowski (1972; 
1987; 1990).   
In one respect, if in no other, Kolakowski stands 
shoulder to shoulder with Schmitt in insisting 
that modern society is underpinned by 
metaphysics.  Science and technology are dominant 
in culture because they provide technical 
solutions to most of life’s day to day problems.  
Despite this, they cannot answer the ultimate 
questions of what is life for, why is the world 
given in one form and not others, and how should 
we live?  These are questions that every child 
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learns, and which adults spend their lifetime’s 
trying to answer.  Might they not be of interest 
to question of why societies appear to need 
celebrity culture?  Viewed from this stand point 
it might be said that Kantorowicz’s (1956) study 
of the Tudor Kings and the doctrine of Two Bodies 
gets things back to front. It over-theorizes the 
political dividends that accrue from the Tudor 
Kings claiming immutability, and under-theorizes 
the need among the Papacy, the clergy and the 
laity for a belief in purposeful order and 
eternal, invulnerable levels of meaning. Viewed 
from this standpoint, it is possible to suggest 
intriguing parallels between the ascribed 
celebrity of Tudor times and the achieved 
celebrity of today.  In both cases, celebrity 
symbolizes transcendence and, in the midst of a 
world hectically governed by incident’s, 
episode’s and emergencies, the reassurance of 
permanent, non-transparent, purposeful order.  
The two bodies of the ascribed and achieved 
celebrity at issue here, may be separated by half 
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a century, but in matching a felt need among 
citizens for a tangible physical presence to 
communicate transcendence and purposeful order 
they are at one.      
Say what you will, in the literature, there is 
strong support for the notion that a confluence 
‘between finite and infinite forces’, and a ready 
accumulation of religious symbolism, mounts-up 
around the body of the highest achieved 
celebrities (Celeste 2005: 33; Williams 2009: 
41). It is surely not by chance that, like ‘God’, 
the potent, multi-layered, super-normative and 
sacred meanings of these figures is reduced to a 
single word. ‘Elvis’, ‘Marilyn’, ‘Marvin’, 
‘Dylan’, ‘Jagger’, ‘Lennon’, ‘Kurt’, ‘Amy’, 
‘Bowie’, ‘Prince’ etc., communicate, at once, 
distinctive, complex systems of escapist, 
transcendent beliefs, identity rituals, rites of 
social inclusion and social exclusion, and 
normative assumptions of social transactions, 
that have reciprocity with religion. They are 
doubly escapist, in that they transport attention 
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from the trouble-bound, apparently unstable, 
tension-strewn present and they suggest 
transcendence. Achieved celebrities symbolize 
escapism, purposeful order and transcendence. And 
what, after all, does religion mean, if not an 
institution that mobilizes types of meaning and 
experience that have to do with escapism, divine 
order and transcendence (Kolakowsi 1982)?  
Celebrity culture in its highest form, is 
dramatically presented and understood, as ‘super-
normative’. It uses religious imagery of 
revelation and magic to aggregate, and intensify, 
public narrative fantasies, and it reproduces, in 
translation, the doctrine of the two bodies, in 
ways that are acceptable to an age which has 
become, nominally, secular (Lofton 2011).  None 
of this is adequately captured by invoking ‘the 
cinematic body’ as an account of the cultural 
impact of the most exalted achieved celebrities.  
To do so confines the field of analysis of 
technical, rational considerations (Roach 2007).  
The salient point here is, that in order to 
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explain the ultimate, boundless appeal of the 
most exalted, it is necessary to leave science 
and technology behind and enter the realm of 
metaphysics, phenomenology and the divine. In all 
of this, the ghost of Henry VIII haunts the 
estate. 
 
Conclusion: Immutable Within Time 
   
Unsurprisingly, because of their popular 
association with autonomous motion and 
transcendence achieved celebrities have regularly  
produced moral panics and religious hostility. In 
respectable society the main worry has not been 
so much that achieved celebrities will create a 
new Church, it is that they act as popular idols,  
drawing energies, loyalties and financial 
resources from the established Church. In the era 
of the Silent Film (1895-1927), moral panics 
against screen idols like Rudolph Valentino, 
Clara Bow, Louise Brooks and Theda Bara, ranged 
on the imagery of sexual licence symbolized by 
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their bodies. The latter were seen as escaping 
and transcending puritan, and respectable, 
boundaries, and engendering the emergence of 
idolaters (Cohen 2001; Koszarski 2008). These 
silent film idols were widely thought to possess 
dangerous, mysterious powers that could wreak 
magic, and havoc, upon the public, and conjure 
scripts of Godless salvation for the hopeless and 
the lowly. Subsequent vintages of achieved 
celebrity generated analogous moral panics and 
metaphysical, quasi-religious beliefs. Elvis 
Presley, Marilyn Monroe, Bob Dylan, Marvin Gaye, 
David Bowie, Prince, have all been examined as, 
inter alia, metaphysical cults, crusaders of new 
narratives of elevated belonging, sacred icons of 
new religious sentiments, and beacons of non-
Godly salvation (McCann 1988; Marcus 1991; Cowan 
2010; Till 2010).   
To be strictly balanced, in the case of all of 
these achieved celebrities, it is doubtful if the 
attribution of genuine religious status holds up. 
Ultimately, they have not generated a sanctified 
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liturgy, nor are they worshipped as the makers of 
undisputed miracles (8). However, their status in 
popular culture as idols, with exceptional, 
enigmatic powers of autonomous motion and 
transcendence, is much more persuasive.  
Synthetically, the doctrine of the King’s two 
bodies arrogated a triple lock of divine, 
legislative and judicial power around the body of 
the Monarch. Today, as befits historically 
significant, forms of ascribed celebrity, certain 
kinds of power over others are still 
automatically acknowledged to be at the disposal 
of the Monarch. The separation of the Monarch 
from decisive powers over the Church and the 
State has not eliminated honorific rights from 
the office. However, compared with the Tudor 
hierarchy of ascribed celebrity, triple lock of 
divine, lesgislative and judicial has been 
jemmied open.   
It can be no part of any worthwhile argument to 
submit that the highest achieved celebrities have 
pirated these powers and taken them for their 
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own. Their position does not deliberately reside 
upon a divine pretext, nor is it popularly 
comprehended to possess a serious legislative or 
judicial reach. Despite this, achieved celebrity 
is not grasped at all, unless it is allowed that 
the authority and power of the highest achieved 
celebrities derive from the accepted, strength to 
‘decide the exception’, and invoke autonomous 
motion, purposeful order and transcendence in 
their actions (Schmitt 2005: 36). The cultural 
importance of celebrity humanitarianism derives 
precisely from this premise. Under the ‘demotic 
turn’ part of the cultural power of achieved 
celebrity comes from their acknowledged right and 
responsibility to ‘speak for us’ (Turner 2004, 
2009). Exalted highest achieved celebrities leave 
an indelible imprint upon the cultural biography 
of the times. Their capacity to reduce social 
barriers and boundaries to molten wax and reform, 
them according to the ‘exception’ decreed by the 
life course of the celebrity, goes much further 
and much deeper than the notion of ‘the cinematic 
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body’ allows. This means recognizing exalted 
achieved celebrities not only as a memory, 
indexing cultural features of a vanished era, but 
as a real political and cultural force that 
exerts influence over the actions of others in 
the present. Exalted achieved celebrities have 
become the unelected representatives of the 
people. The fact that their actions are formally 
unaccountable, does not impair their effects. The 
exceptionalism of autonomous motion and 
transcendence has a tenable, trans-historical 
significance. The two bodies of The Tudor King 
expressed first a biological fact and a 
relationship with the body politic. The 
corrigible body dies, as all bodies must. 
However, the incorrigible body is understood to 
be ‘immutable within time’ (Greenblat 2009: 64). 
Like angels and spirits, they span the ages. The 
two bodies of the highest achieved celebrities 
have the same quality and same purpose, which is 
to symbolize continuity in the body politic.  
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A cliché in a certain kind of (functionalist) 
sociology is that the individual is an atom of 
society. To extend the analogy, the biological 
life-term of the highest achieved celebrity is a 
crystal ball through which one may legitimately, 
hope to survey and understand the entire society 
and culture of the era and provide a routeway to 
the future. It is not fortuitous then, that the 
death of such a specimen produces waves of 
mourning and tributes that are not limited to the 
fan-base, but are culture-wide, unbounded in 
duration (we still ‘miss’ Elvis, Marilyn, Marvin 
and more lately, Michael, Amy and David). Despite 
being physically dead, they are palpably present 
in culture.   
One initial, concrete articulation of this, is 
the assembly of ‘spontaneous shrines’, to 
commemorate a celebrity supernova (Santino 2001). 
Fans, and people who would otherwise be 
bystanders, are caught-up in official, socially 
inclusive, ceremonial commemorative rituals. It 
is one thing for the people to leave flowers, 
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messages and other offerings at a site associated 
with a beloved deceased Monarch or political 
leader.  This is what one would expect of a dead 
figure who symbolizes the official system.  But 
the dead star is often perceived and valued as 
someone who lived outside the system and who 
represent demotic powers that organized politics 
and state occasions fail to encapsulate. 
Frequently, those who leave offerings at 
spontaneous shrines display scrupulous attention 
and respect in their choice and positioning of 
leave-taking items (Graves-Brown and Orange 2017: 
122). They are not only leaving markers that pay 
tribute to a great life, they are suggesting a 
template through which the life can be understood 
and its demotic significance, measured. Flowers 
and toys figure prominently, as they do in 
funeral rituals for a loved one that is directly 
a member of the kith and kin network. Visual data 
relating to the spontaneous shrines assembled 
outside Amy Winehouse’s house in Camden Square, 
North London (where she died in 2011), were 
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reminiscent of the spontaneous offerings left 
outside the home of Freddie Mercury, where he 
died in 1991. They anticipated the spontaneous 
improvised shrines dedicated to David Bowie, who 
died in 2016, (the main one’s were outside his 
apartment suite, where he also died, in Lafayette 
Street, Manhattan, and Tunstall Road, Brixton 
where he grew up) (Graves-Brown and Orange 2017). 
The spontaneous shrine is popular and democratic, 
but simultaneously, it resembles the traditional, 
religious altar of worship, i.e. the immortal 
tabernacle of forgiveness and retribution, that 
forms the axis of funeral rights in orthodox 
Christian religion. Life dictates that these 
shrines are eventually taken down and cast aside.  
Yet outside Amy Winehouse’s house in Camden 
Square and Bowie’s apartment in Lafayette Street,  
messages, flowers and other offerings are still 
evident.   
The biological life of the star is popularly 
regarded to be just one of their manifestations. 
In Graham McCann’s (1988) phrase, when the 
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highest achieved celebrity physically dies, what 
is left, is ‘the body in the library’. In asking 
why high achieved celebrities such as James Dean, 
Marilyn Monroe, Judy Garland, Billy Holliday, 
Elvis Presley, John Lennon, etc., are immutable 
within time, the analogy of the star’s two bodies 
is inescapable. Technology means that the 
mediated (incorrigible body) can theoretically, 
persist in culture ad infinitum. It is not 
however innocent. Like everything human, it is 
not free from politically interested, politically 
determined forces.  
The aims of the present paper will have been 
served, if the reader is persuaded that the 
doctrine of the King’s two bodies did not die 
with the overthrow of Royal absolutism. Its 
endurance in greatly translated form today, 
reprises old questions relating to 
conglomerations of autonomous motion, 
metaphysical transcendence and purposeful order 
around the body of celebrity. The troubling 
element in this proposition relates to the 
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survival of a version of the doctrine in a 
political system of Liberal Plebiscitary 
Parliamentary Democracy that formally, is based 
on homogeneous equality. Is it sufficient to 
regard the exalted forms of achieved celebrity as 
compensations for the failure of liberalism to 
perpetually deliver what it perpetually promises?  
Or does the complicity of achieved celebrity, 
with autonomous motion, metaphysical 
transcendence and escapism, suggest a deep, 
under-explored relationship between moral 
regulation and social conformity? For reasons of 
space, the exploration of relationships between 
the posthumous body of the highest achieved 
celebrities and these forces, must be a matter 
for future work. What can be claimed here is 
nothing more than a small lifting of the veil 
from a subject that is of great interest to the 
study of celebrity.  That is, the elevation by 
exalted celebrities to a status only accorded to 
Monarch’s between the Medieval and Tudor period: 





(1) Carl Schmitt (1888-1985), was a political 
theorist and legal jurist who, as we shall 
see, was ruined in academic and public 
life by reason of his perceived complicity 
with Nazism.  
(2) Corpus mysticum literally means ‘mystical 
body’ (Kantorowicz 1957: 15).  Its 
original referent was the Eucharist or 
consecrated host. That is the symbol of 
Christ (and therefore God) in the 
normative order.  Gradually, the notion 
evolved to refer to the idea that the 
Church is immutable. 
(3) The term ‘autonomous motion’ refers to 
frictionless movement over others.  
(4) Schmitt wrote after the Treaty of  
Versailles (1919), which was widely 
regarded to be punitive in its 
requirements over the Germans.   
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His doubts about the integrity of  
Liberal Plebiscitary Parliamentary 
Democracy surely derive from what 
John Maynard Keynes scathingly 
referred to as a ‘Carthaginian 
Peace’ of Versailles. 
  
(5) But contra Henich, Churches have been 
founded around secular achieved 
celebrities who are regarded to have 
miraculous powers and to be transcendent. 
For example, in 1978, in the city of 
Rosario, Argentina, the Church of Iglesia 
Maradoniana was founded to worship the 
Argentinian soccer star, Diego Maradona. 
The Iglesia is estimated to currently have 
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